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Disruptive reform is a heady, alluring tool for 
champions of social change, and as Gigi 
Georges and Tim Glynn Burke point out in a 
series of case studies, if done well, it can reap 
significant rewards. 
As the US grapples with fiscal crisis—facing spiraling deficits, dangerous levels of debt and the worst economic recession in some 70 years—Americans 
understand that all levels of their government must take 
action. Calls are growing louder from across the political 
spectrum for the same spirit of cost-cutting and financial 
restraint within government that so many families have had 
to embrace. 
According to a Pew Research Center poll in early 2011, 
however, even while Americans increasingly recognise the 
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By political risk, we mean two things. First is the possibility 
that one funds a new programme or enacts a new policy, 
and it fails miserably, costs spiral out of control, or it leads 
to some tragic outcome like the death of a child under state 
care. The second type is the risk of being voted out of office 
or becoming the object of attack by constituent groups 
that benefited from, and liked very much, the incumbent 
programme or policy you are looking to defund, or shrink, or 
replace with a new one. Why even undertake these efforts if 
the potential cost is so great? In both cases, the payoff, of 
course, is that an innovation leads to greater social outcomes 
for more constituents and, subsequently, earns the support 
of a larger portion of the public.
To overcome both types of political risk, policymakers can 
learn from successful innovators who have intentionally 
entered the breach, disrupted incumbent systems, and lived 
to tell about it. Among those we spoke with, we found three 
models that mitigate, navigate and overcome the political 
opposition to disruptive social innovation: Leadership from 
a strong champion with substantial credibility/authority; 
engagement or coalition building among citizens and 
stakeholders; and the creative use of public and philanthropic 
dollars to either underwrite financial risk or create new 
financial incentives as political cover.
“
While much attention has 
been paid in the past few 
years to the importance of 
improving collaboration 
around public problem 
solving (i.e. cross-sector 
cooperation, networked 
governance, “silo-busting”), 
the innovators we spoke 
with saw disruption as 
a key tool in working to 
bring about transformative 
change.
New Social Models
to embrace specific cuts. There is still not one area of 
domestic federal spending—whether education, veterans’ 
benefits, health care or public safety—that more Americans, 
when pressed, want to decrease more than they want to 
increase.1  
This current landscape highlights a difficult tension. On the 
one hand, the tides appear to be turning on the persistent 
escalation of public spending in the US, and even broad-
based benefit programs like Social Security and Medicare 
are no longer regarded as sacred cows. Yet, when elected 
officials attempt to cut back benefits and entitlements, they 
are confronted with counter-tides of organised opposition 
from those who have the most to lose.
For anyone courageous enough to seek to drive major 
policy change in the face of large scale and seemingly 
insurmountable political hurdles like those faced by US 
government officials today, we offer some tangible lessons 
from the world of social innovation.
The Power of Social Innovation
These lessons are drawn from our research into the 
intersection of government and social entrepreneurship. We 
recently contributed to a new book, The Power of Social 
Innovation, for which we spoke with around a hundred 
innovators from the government, non-profits, business and 
philanthropic sectors.2 
These innovators shared important lessons for effecting 
social change. In particular, they emphasise the importance 
of opening space for new ideas, trusting citizens to know 
what is best for them, the value of increasing expectations 
for individual potential and responsibility, and the value of not 
just growing an organisation, but working with others inside 
the social production system to effect change. 
While much attention has been paid in the past few years 
to the importance of improving collaboration around public 
problem solving (i.e. cross-sector cooperation, networked 
governance, “silo-busting”), the innovators we spoke with 
saw disruption as a key tool in working to bring about 
transformative change.
By disruption, we mean a break from business as usual, and 
some type of forceful action to alter the inertia of existing 
delivery systems that have attracted powerful constituent 
groups but that fall short in serving the need of citizens. 
Disruption can come in a variety of forms: A new technology 
or programme model, new pipelines for volunteer or donor 
goodwill, or an outside strategic partner that catalyses 
dramatic systemic and cultural shifts. But what binds 
these approaches is that disruption in the social sector—
in particular, one dominated by government dollars and 
authority like we find in the US—is an inherently politically 
risky endeavour and, as a result, unattractive to politicians 
and career public officials alike. 
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To illustrate each strategy, we explore three cases in which 
civic entrepreneurs have sought to address the political risk 
that their innovations presented to the status quo. These 
cases highlight a handful of principles that are important to 
incorporate when taking big risks, and whose absence can 
thwart even the best-designed innovations. 
One quick note before we begin: How is it that these 
lessons are not only useful for service innovators working 
on the front lines of their communities’ daily struggles, but 
equally so for policymakers who are contemplating highly 
unpopular changes in social benefit programmes that will 
affect millions of people? As we will see in the following 
US-based case studies, social services and broad-based 
entitlement programmes share a purpose: To address 
significant social needs. Both are funded primarily by the 
public sector and often rely on local actors. Finally, both have 
led to the development of well-organised factions that seek 
to protect and promote the interests of either beneficiaries 
or providers.
Case Study 1: Driving Neighbourhood Change in 
Central Los Angeles
We begin with the story of Blair Taylor and the highly influential 
non-profit Los Angeles Urban League (LAUL). It offers an 
inspiring example of how one can underwrite significant 
political risk by stepping up as a forceful champion and 
strategically building consensus for reform.
The local branch of LAUL commands great respect in Los 
Angeles, where for almost a century it has championed 
equality for African-Americans. Its educational programmes 
and employment services reach as many as 100,000 local 
residents every year, earning it broad name recognition 
and trust within the local community. Yet despite these 
impressive efforts, in virtually every facet of their lives, 
African-Americans have fewer opportunities than Angelinos 
of other ethnicities.3
  
When LAUL hired Blair Taylor as its new CEO in 2005, he 
immediately challenged not only public services in Los 
Angeles, but also in his own organisation. Taylor quickly 
diagnosed the steady deterioration in the community as the 
result of various social service delivery systems—education, 
employment, safety, health, and housing—acting too 
independently. 
Many of these efforts, in public safety and education for 
example, were beyond LAUL’s control. The very public 
launch and depressing message of a 2005 report by LAUL 
and local United Way, “The State of Black Los Angeles,” 
gave Taylor the additional authority he needed to act boldly. 
And his position at LAUL provided a trusted platform from 
which to take the risk of proposing a bold effort to holistically 
address the needs of a troubled community.
After months of working with consultants and talking to the 
community, LAUL committed to Neighborhoods@Work, a 
$25 million, five-year effort designed to concentrate private 
and government assistance in a seventy-square block area 
called Park Mesa Heights. The organisation promised to 
report publicly on the progress of their effort.
The innovation is a dense set of relationships between 
private actors and elected public officials and administrators. 
But Taylor had to begin by first embarking on the difficult 
process of convincing his closest stakeholders that LAUL’s 
well-intentioned work had not, to date, produced the desired 
results. 
Because LAUL’s staff presence and operations were woven 
into the community’s fabric over decades of work, the 
organisation started with a level of trust within the community 
that elected officials and even the best-intentioned outsiders 
could never match. Taylor put this reputation and trust to 
work. When someone raised the risk of failure as an excuse 
for not collaborating, Taylor stepped in to assume the risk. 
For example, one of his first partners was L.A. Police Chief Bill 
Bratton. “A lot of people told me this was a crazy strategy,” 
Taylor said. “Black people don’t get along with the LAPD. 
“
These cases highlight 
a handful of principles 
that are important 
to incorporate when 
taking big risks, 
and whose absence 
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You’ll never make that work.” Taylor’s response to this very 
honest, and likely very common, concern? “Effectively, what 
we’ve done is to say ‘OK, point your finger at us. If we can’t 
achieve this in five years, you don’t have to go beat up Chief 
Bratton. You can come right to the door of this community-
based organisation. Blame us.’”4 
This innoculation against reputational damage also made 
it easier for the local business community to participate. 
According to Taylor, “Corporations say, ‘I’m going to give 
you two million bucks, because if you’re risking the Urban 
League and you’re putting everything you have on the line 
for this model, then certainly we believe that it’s going to 
work.”5 
Within three years, through the coordinated engagement 
of over a hundred local providers from all sectors, the Park 
Mesa Heights neighbourhood saw a 17% reduction in 
violent crimes and an 80% decrease in homicides. Under 
a unique partnership between LAUL, University of Southern 
California’s Rossier School of Education, and the Tom & Ethel 
Bradley Foundation, Crenshaw High School graduation rates 
increased from 41% in 2006-07 to 65% in 2008-09, while 
truancy rates decreased by 10%. Parents who were fleeing 
the troubled school have now seen a substantial turnaround 
and enrollment is increasing. 
Case Study 2: Engaging Aspiring Homeowners in 
Washington, D.C.
Blessed with an entrepreneurial spirit, Bo Menkiti has always 
had a passion for social change. Since 2004, he has operated 
The Menkiti Group as a real estate brokerage firm, real estate 
developer and community educator to improve access to 
home ownership for hundreds of low and moderate income 
families, while developing commercial space for aspiring 
small business owners in the neighbourhoods of north-east 
Washington, D.C.
Menkiti’s success depends on a deep commercial expertise 
and an even deeper knowledge of his target neighbourhood. 
We see The Menkiti Group as an excellent example of 
consensus building among stakeholders—in particular the 
important step in any effort to engage, understand and 
incorporate constituents’ perspectives in one’s work.
Early in the process, Menkiti found that many people in 
the neighbourhood lacked basic information about home 
ownership; so, he incorporated education and outreach into 
the responsibilities of his brokerage staff. Making his brokers 
salary-based allows them to spend time on increasing 
“Within three years, through the coordinated engagement of over a hundred local providers from all 
sectors, the Park 
Mesa Heights 
neighbourhood saw 
a 17% reduction in 
violent crimes and 
an 80% decrease in 
homicides.
awareness and access to real estate services in the local 
community. This in-person education and outreach work, in 
turn, helps Menkiti both keep his finger on the pulse of the 
local market while attracting new customers.
His attentiveness to customers while growing the brokerage 
business led to a unique understanding that the local supply 
of houses for low to middle-income buyers was scarce. 
“What we began to notice in Washington, D.C. was that 
the growing development had created two tiers of housing. 
There was high market rate, luxury housing and there was 
subsidised housing. But most of the people we were dealing 
with didn’t qualify for subsidised housing and couldn’t afford 
luxury housing.”6 
The responsiveness that triggered this insight was by design. 
After years in the non-profit sector, Menkiti relishes the 
rigour and intense competition of the for-profit marketplace, 
believing that the added pressure forces his firm to develop 
New Social Models
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in a more sustainable manner so that it can better serve and 
understand its clients. 
He had seen among traditional non-profit providers, and even 
other innovators, a disconnect with the consumer or client. 
When a firm does not rely on government or philanthropic 
funding, its survival and growth depend on one thing; acutely 
responding to consumers’ needs in an efficient manner. 
Menkiti calls this “getting back to this core understanding of 
the consumer.”
This discovery of the city’s gap in housing prompted Menkiti 
to pursue developing new residential properties “priced for 
people from 40 to 80% of the area median income to be able 
to afford it.” He used his own savings and borrowed money 
from family to begin a residential development arm. 
The Menkiti Group has brokered tens of millions of dollars 
in sales and developed tens of thousands of square feet of 
residential and commercial space, providing high-quality, 
affordable housing for more than five hundred people. 
Menkiti, himself, retains some of his profits to create 
long-term wealth-building opportunities for employees 
and allocates the remainder to educational, economic, 
and cultural opportunities for youths and residents in the 
neighbourhoods in which they work.
Finally, Menkiti is an important example because he views 
his clients as a critical part of their own progress, rather than 
passive recipients of his assistance; which explains his dislike 
of the word “helping.” “We talk about supporting people 
who are doing something for themselves. If an individual or a 
community does not bring an underlying asset base or value 
proposition to the table, we will be hard pressed to make 
an impact with them.” A commitment to understanding 
a community and valuing its potential are early steps in 
successful engagement and organising.
Case Study 3: Using Creative Financial Tools
In addition to securing a strong champion with credibility and 
building close ties among constituencies and stakeholders, a 
third strategy is the creative use of public and private dollars. 
Two powerful ways to do this are to underwrite financial 
risk or to offer the potential for new financial investment as 
incentive to encourage broader public support for pursuing 
ground-breaking solutions to difficult challenges.
For example, New York City’s Center for Economic 
Opportunity (CEO) operates an innovation fund with a 
portfolio of more than 40 poverty-fighting initiatives. Under 
the leadership of Deputy Mayor Linda Gibbs and Director 
Veronica White, CEO’s twelve-member staff scans the nation 
and globe for innovations that show promise in assisting the 
city’s working poor, young adults and children. 
CEO has $125 million in city dollars, and another $25 million 
in private funds, to replicate in New York City models that help 
lift families and individuals out of poverty with an emphasis 
on personal responsibility. Providers of job training, asset 
building or other poverty-alleviating service innovations vie for 
funds through competitive bidding, and must demonstrate 
in their applications how they would collaborate with other 
government and philanthropic efforts. CEO then conducts 
rigorous external evaluations of the selected organisations. 
If successful, innovations are implemented in an expanded 
form and if not, they are scaled back or terminated.
The programmes CEO funds fill service gaps, meet unmet 
needs, and provide opportunities for low-income New 
Yorkers to gain economic security and independence for 
themselves and their families. Often, CEO’s portfolio includes 
controversial pilot plans that otherwise would not be funded 
and tested. One such case was the CEO-funded conditional 
cash transfer programme, a particularly interesting anti-
poverty effort that rewarded individuals with cash when they 
made and kept dental appointments, improved grades, and 
performed other positive behaviours. 
The programme, as expected, turned out to be controversial. 
Opponents charged that paying individuals for doing what 
they should want to do on their own undermines personal 
responsibility. At the time, Deputy Mayor Linda Gibbs 
described conditional cash transfers as “too controversial, 
“
Menkiti is an 
important example 
because he views his 
clients as a critical 
part of their own 
progress, rather than 
passive recipients of 
his assistance; which 
explains his dislike of 
the word “helping.”
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in our opinion, to start with public funds.” The active support 
of the Rockefeller Foundation and other philanthropic 
donors played an important role in the programme’s 
political feasibility. As Gibbs put it, the city “engaged those 
foundations as our partners in arms to sell and defend the 
programme, expanding the protective force around it.”7
 
How else can the government use financial incentives to 
encourage performance oriented risk-taking and innovation? 
Two current examples initiated by the US federal government 
show promise: The “Race to the Top” initiative in which the 
federal government incentivises public-sector political risk 
taking in education at the state and local levels, and “Pay 
for Success” bonds which, as proposed, would incentivise 
private sector investments in activities that are traditionally 
funded by taxpayers.
Race to the Top is a competitive grant initiative launched in 
2009 by US Education Secretary and former Chicago Schools 
Chancellor Arnie Duncan. In 2010, states across the country 
competed for a piece of the grant’s $4.35 billion made 
available through the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act. With these funds at his disposal and a clean slate for 
crafting the initiative, Duncan seized the opportunity to move 
the education playing field toward innovation and risk-taking 
and away from the legacy and compliance based funding 
that traditionally dominated public sector funding.  
Duncan explicitly designed Race to the Top to reward states 
that “demonstrated success in raising student achievement 
and have the best plans to accelerate their reforms” through 
ambitious and promising innovative strategies.8 In the midst 
of the recession and facing increasingly tight budgets of 
their own, states aggressively competed for much-needed 
additional funds. 
The competition drove elected leaders in many of the 
41 applicant states to take political risks in their policy 
choices, passing typically “untouchable” measures such as 
performance pay for teachers, alternative teacher certification 
and more rigourous teacher evaluation measures; shifting 
policies on school improvement; and seeking expansion 
of charter schools or other innovative school management 
model.9 Many of these changes initially faced significant 
organised opposition, but Race to the Top changed the 
political equation and enabled leaders to overcome resistance 
and, in some cases, open the door to unlikely alliances for 
dramatic reforms. 
Our second federal example also hails from the Obama 
Administration. In his 2012 budget, the President proposed 
a $100 million experiment called “Pay for Success.” The 
measure is subject to congressional approval, but its 
philosophy and approach makes it ripe for bi-partisan 
support. 
Drawing upon the recently launched UK social impact bond 
model, “Pay for Success” seeks to infuse a performance-
based market discipline into social and human services. In 
the proposed US pilot, the private sector can buy government 
issued bonds to help fund privately run programmes in such 
areas as education, juvenile justice and job training. The 
government sets advance performance measures for these 
programmes. If performance targets are met over a specified 
period of time, the government pays the investors back with 
interest or bonuses. If targets are not met, the government 
pays nothing. 
The approach would incentivise private sector investors and 
providers to drive toward results and gives long-suffering 
taxpayers, who routinely watch their money disappear into 
ineffective programmes and policies, something to cheer 
about. The private sector bears all the financial risk with 
potential for financial and social rewards.
What Do We Now Know?
So how do we apply these strategies to the highly unpopular 
cuts to broad based entitlement programmes like Social 
Security and Medicare that take up so much of the federal 
budget?
First, is the opportunity for leadership from a strong 
champion with substantial credibility and authority. The LA 
Urban League’s Taylor was the highly credible leader of a 
New Social Models
“
The approach would incentivise private sector 
investors and providers to drive toward results and 
gives long-suffering taxpayers, who routinely watch 
their money disappear into ineffective programmes 
and policies, something to cheer about.
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strong organisation. As champion of the effort, he staked 
his organisation’s reputation—as well as his own—on 
actual progress. Taylor also made clear that while LAUL 
would absorb much of the risk of the effort failing, he would 
ensure that partners would receive ample credit for their 
contributions.
Governors like Mitch Daniels of Indiana, Chris Christie of 
New Jersey and Scott Walker of Wisconsin have publicly 
confronted the unsustainable levels of public employee 
pension and health care commitments in their states, 
judging them to be severely under-funded burdens for state 
and municipal governments alike. While it remains to be 
seen whether their leadership will yield long-term results or 
positive outcomes for their political futures, we need this type 
of courageous championing to resolve budget problems that 
are related to broad-based entitlements. 
Second is the potential of building consensus or coalitions 
among citizens and stakeholders. Taylor not only provided 
leadership for the additional city investment, but also 
aggressively sought out consensus among stakeholders 
to take action in an integrated way, while providing the 
community with a voice and opportunity to engage. In 
particular, he held those stakeholders accountable to the 
reform vision and implementation plans. He insisted that 
partners in the effort must subject themselves to clear 
metrics, transparency, and public meetings.
Mobilize is an example of a non-governmental 
organisation that combines the potential of social media 
to organise large groups with shared interests and 
traditional grassroots consensus-building strategies. 
Hosting “Democracy 2.0” summits, Mobilize has 
engaged 1,500 people directly and over 10,000 virtually 
on issues from civic participation to higher education 
for young veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. 
While Blair Taylor and Bo Menkiti’s engagement is 
confined to one community, Mobilize uses the power 
of online media to amplify locally based mobilisation 
of public will to communities across the country. It is 
an excellent example of the new non-partisan models 
we need for capturing and amplifying the voice of more 
citizens who might not otherwise be engaged in large-
scale national challenges.
Sparking Change Online 
Whatever your cause or wherever you fall on the ideological 
spectrum, social media offer unprecedented tools for 
organising. In the US, the Tea Party sparked and grew into a 
national movement in 2010 in large part through Twitter and 
Facebook, as like-minded voters coalesced around a shared 
frustration with the size and direction of government and 
mobilised into a political force with a rapidity that would not 
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have been possible in a pre-social media world. An earlier 
version of this story, although more centralised and organised 
around a single national candidate can be told about 
Moveon.org, the Internet-based political action committee 
that rocketed Democrat Howard Dean’s 2004 presidential 
campaign into the national spotlight and helped galvanise 
many of its three million members around Barack Obama 
in 2008. More recently—and most dramatically—much 
has been written about the role of Facebook and Twitter in 
sparking regime change in Egypt, Tunisia and beyond.
Finally, political cover when enacting change can come from 
the creative use of public and philanthropic dollars to either 
underwrite financial risk or create new financial incentives. 
We must identify and test our most innovative solutions—
what we might call positive deviants—that haven’t gained 
wide recognition, and support the expansion of those that 
demonstrate early results. New York City’s CEO innovation 
fund is an attractive model for investment in this approach. 
Similarly, innovative financial arrangements can be used 
to incentivise the tough changes required for entitlement 
reforms, public pension reductions and other spending cuts. 
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While tackling necessary Medicare cuts, for example, the 
federal government might create incentives for programme 
efficiencies, reward choices that cut waste and limit 
unnecessary procedures, and catalyse private investment 
in health-related innovations that focus on doing more with 
less.
Innovators like Blair Taylor, Bo Menkiti and Linda Gibbs 
have shown us how to tackle the political hurdles of change 
through calculated risk-taking, stakeholder engagement, and 
creative risk capital. They also show that the more disruptive 
an innovator is in pursuing a goal, the more risk-taking is 
required and the greater the tension between the desire 
to disrupt and the impulse (and need) for collaboration/
consensus-building. 
This risk-taking can come in a number of forms, but political, 
organisational, and financial are among the most prevalent. 
Executed successfully with the right tools, high-risk, high 
disruption strategies can yield dramatic results. True, leading 
the way might feel like jumping blindly off a cliff. On the other 
hand, staying on the current path almost certainly will lead 
to a fall.
